The Irish Bulletin by Brian P. Murphy OSB.

The Brian P. Murphy  OSB Archive.

A review to mark the publication of

Volume 1 of  ‘The Irish Bulletin’ (2012)


This publication contains not only the first volume of the Irish Bulletin (11 November 1919-1 May 1920) but also the earlier publication of a Weekly Summary which began on 12 July 1919 with events from the previous week.  The book is a very important primary source for the history of the period, Ireland c.1919-1921, and is made all the more valuable by having an index; not one, but three, of person, place and miscellaneous.  In the past the Aubane Historical Society have contributed towards making source material available by re-publishing such books as those by Major C.J.C. Street, ‘The Administration of Ireland’ 1920 (Athol/Belfast, 2001); Lionel Curtis, ‘Ireland’ 1921 (Athol, 2002); and General F.P. Crozier, ‘The Men I Killed’ (Athol, 2002) The present publication of the Irish Bulletin, with a valuable introduction by Brendan Clifford, is a continuation of that fine tradition and is to be welcomed.

Attitudes towards the Irish Bulletin, it may be suggested, indicate the contrasting ways of looking at the events of the period.  Two men with important roles in the British administration in Ireland, at that time, had no doubt that the Bulletin was to be condemned: for example,  Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary at Dublin Castle, referred to it, on 25 November 1920, as ‘the murder gang’s publication,’ ‘a hideous document of falsehood,’ which ‘ought not to be the foundation for the literature of any member of this House;’ (‘a hideous document’) and Captain H.B.C. Pollard, the Press Officer at the Police Authority, described it as ‘a malignant and lying sheet.’ (‘David Hogan,’ ‘Four Glorious Years’ Irish Press/Dublin, 1953’, p.107; H.B.C. Pollard, ‘The Secret Societies of Ireland’ Allan/London, 1922, p.186; Brian P. Murphy, ‘The Origins and Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland 1920’ Aubane, 2006, p.47) 

Historians of our own time differ on the value of the Bulletin: Roy Foster dismissed it as ‘brilliant at scaling up any military activity into a “notorious” looting or sacking.’ (Foster, ‘Modern Ireland’ p.499)  Arthur Mitchell, on the other hand, while frankly recounting its weaknesses, relied on it extensively to detail the positive work of Dáil Éireann and D.G. Boyce, in his seminal study of the press and propaganda, ‘Englishmen and Irish Troubles’ recognised its importance. (Arthur Mitchell, ‘Revolutionary Government in Ireland, Dáil Éireann 1919-1921’ Gill and MacMillan/Dublin, 1995, pp 103-105; D.G. Boyce, ‘Englishmen and Irish Troubles. British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-1922’ Cape/London, 1972, pp 85-88)  Recent writers on propaganda and the Irish Press such as Ian Kenneally and Maurice Walsh have also analysed its contents and acknowledged its worth. (Maurice Walsh, ‘The News from Ireland. Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution’ Tauris, London/New York, first published 2008/also 2011; Ian Kenneally, ‘The Paper Wall. Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921’ Collins/Dublin, 2008) 

Foster, it should be noted, by rejecting the Irish Bulletin and other related source material, introduced allegations of sectarianism into the historical debate some years before Peter Hart, writing, in 1988, that ‘the emotions focused by cultural revivalism around the turn of the century were fundamentally sectarian and even racialist.’  A sweeping judgement that completely ignored the opinion of Douglas Hyde, the Protestant President of the Gaelic League, made in January 1913, that he had never known ‘any member to be shaken or biased one iota by sectarian considerations.’  (R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, Penguin Press/London, 1988, p.453; Brian Murphy, ‘The Canon of Irish Cultural History: Some Questions concerning Roy Foster’s Modern Ireland, in Ciaran Brady (ed.) Interpreting Irish History, Irish Academic Press/Dublin, 1994, pp 223-225)  In a similar fashion, Peter Hart has ignored the Irish Bulletin (it appears only as a footnote) and cognate sources with similar consequences to that of Roy Foster – a view of Irish life in which sectarianism plays a major part. (Peter Hart, ‘The IRA and its Enemies. Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923’ Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1998, p.67 for fn 154) The evidence of the Irish Bulletin and the voices of all those associated with it tell a different story and that is one reason why the publication of this book is so important.

Origins: The Sinn Féin Department of Publicity, March 1918

The Irish Bulletin and the Weekly Summary were founded as part of the work of the Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity/Propaganda which was created on 2 April 1919 with Laurence Ginnell as its first head. (DE Minutes, 2 April 1919, p.36)  In turn this Dáil Éireann Department of Propaganda had its origins in the Sinn Féin Publicity Department which had been created in March 1918 with Robert Brennan as Head and Frank Gallagher as his assistant.  Their task was to promote the aims and ideals of the new republican Sinn Féin party which had been formed in October 1917.  The  work of this department, and the context in which it worked, provide valuable insights not only into the personal characters of Brennan and Gallagher but also into the character of British rule in Ireland with its emphasis on the DORA and a Press Censor.

Robert Brennan (born Wexford 1881) and Frank Gallagher (born Cork 1893) were appointed to roles in the Sinn Féin publicity department in early March 1918.  Both men were experienced journalists: Brennan was appointed Head of the Sinn Féin Publicity Department at a salary of £3 a week and was given an office at 6 Harcourt Street; Gallagher soon joined him. (Robert Brennan, Eamon de Valera: A Memoir, UCD Press, 2002, p.117)  Gallagher informed his fiancée, Cecilia Saunders, on 10 March 1918, that ‘it has always been a clear desire of your most humble and adoring to draft circulars, handbills and pamphlets for Sinn Féin of that indisputably logical kind for which the policy of complete independence gives much opportunities.’ (Gallagher to Cecilia Saunders, 10 March 1918, Gallagher Papers, 10050/38, Trinity College MS)      

Somewhat earlier, on 31 January 1918, Gallagher had told Cecilia Saunders that, while participating in the South Armagh by-election campaign, he had met Desmond FitzGerald who was in charge of the campaign.  Gallagher described as ‘an exceedingly nice young man’ who ‘talks with a particularly almost an appealing English accent but his credentials to Nationalism are most excellent.’  Gallagher then mentioned that FitzGerald had taken part in the Easter Rising; that he wrote ‘exceedingly good poetry; and that they had become good friends.’ (Gallagher to Saunders, 31 Jan. 1918, Gallagher Papers, 10050/18, Trinity College MS)  Further contact was made between them during the other by-elections of 1918.  From early 1918, therefore, there was contact between the three men who were to play central roles in the founding and running of the Irish Bulletin in 1919.  Their work was complemented by other journals, for example An tÓglach, the official journal of the Irish Volunteers, which was first published on 15 August 1918.  It was edited by Piaras Beaslai and printed by Joe Stanley, the printer who had played such an important role in printing material at the time of the Easter Rising. (Tom Reilly, Joe Stanley. Printer to the Rising, Brandon/Dingle, 2005, pp 129-131)

The British administration in Ireland, as represented by Dublin Castle, responded to the work of Brennan, Gallagher and other Sinn Féiners by enforcing the Defence of the Realm Act.  The imposition of this Act coloured the character of English rule in Ireland from 1914 to 1921.  The Press Censor, Lord Decies, who had been appointed in June 1916, issued a press directive on 29 March 1918 which illustrated the environment in which Brennan and Gallagher operated.  It stated that ‘in the event of your being asked to publish memorial, anniversary, or other notices in your advertisement columns, which refer to the Rebellion of Easter 1916, you are requested to submit them to this Office before insertions.’ (James Carty, Bibliography of Irish History 1912-1921, NLI/Dublin, p. xxii)  In other words the memories and ideals of 1916 were to be strictly controlled.  Press censorship formed only part of the implementation of DORA:  at the same time, Laurence Ginnell (in late March) and Michael Collins (on 2 April) were arrested and imprisoned.  Files from the Crime Department, Special Branch, of the RIC contained detailed information of the movements of both men and accurate descriptions of them.  Action was then taken against them in conjunction with the Competent Military Authority.

Despite these restrictions Brennan and Gallagher went about their work, as did those working on other nationalist journals, and the success of their efforts was recognised by Decies himself.  In his Press Censorship Report for the month of March 1918, he reported that there had been a marked increase in Sinn Féin propaganda and stated that ‘the general impression conveyed by the months output is that Sinn Féin has marshalled the various phases of its propaganda and is representing a more coherent case to the public.  The leading text is that England holds Ireland by force, divorced from moral right.’ (Press Censorship Reports, March 1918, CO 904/166/2, NA Kew)  This observation by Decies on the theme of Sinn Féin propaganda sums up perfectly the aims of Brennan and Gallagher.  Indeed, it might well serve as the motto for the future Irish Bulletin which, reflecting the proclamations of Dáil Éireann, constantly proclaimed the message that ‘England holds Ireland by force, divorced from moral right.’

The application of DORA, severe as it was, increased immeasurably, after a series of events on 9 April 1918: firstly, the German offensive began on the western front; secondly, the report on the Irish Convention (adjourned on 5 April) was presented to the House of Commons marking an end of an agreed solution to Irish problems; and, thirdly, a Military Service Bill, applying Conscription to Ireland, was introduced and implemented on 16 April.  For a short time all Irish parties were united and the role of Brennan and Gallagher took on another dimension.  On 18 April 1918 representatives of the Irish Party, the Labour Party and of Sinn Féin met in the Mansion House, Dublin, and affirmed ‘Ireland’s separate and distinct nationhood’ and declared that ‘the passing of the Conscription Bill by the British House of Commons must be regarded as a declaration of war on the Irish nation.’  The Roman Catholic hierarchy also issued a statement supporting this protest. (Arthur Mitchell and Pádraig O Snodaigh, eds., ‘Irish Political Documents 1916-1949’ Irish Academic Press/Dublin, 1985, pp 41-43)  Following the deportation of de Valera on 18 May, Robert Brennan completed an address to the President of the United States from the Mansion House Conference.  Published in pamphlet form the address serves as a reminder that the Sinn Féin publicity department retained, and renewed, the ties that linked their cause with the support of Irish-Americans. (Brennan, Ibid. p.117; No Conscription. Ireland’s Case Re-stated, Dublin, 1918)

The response of the British Government made it clear that war had been declared on the Irish nation.  Lord French, on 5 May 1918, informed Lloyd George that he accepted the position of Lord Lieutenant in order ‘to set up a quasi-military government in Ireland with a soldier Lord Lieutenant.’  Several studies by Eunan O’Halpin have detailed the character of this government. (Richard Holmes, ‘The Little Field Marshal. A Life of Lord French, London’ 1984, p.338 citing French to Lloyd George, 5 May 1918, French Papers; Eunan O’Halpin, ‘British Intelligence in Ireland, 1914-1921’ in Christopher Andrews and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, London, 1984, p.66; see also Eunan O’Halpin, ‘Historical Revision XX: H.E. Duke and the Irish administration 1916-1918,’ Irish Historical Studies, Sept. 1981)  French, as Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, had been responsible for the appointment of General Maxwell to the Irish Command and he had fully supported the policy of execution after the Easter Rising.  Soon after his arrival in Ireland, on 17 May, he invoked DORA to arrest and to deport without trial over one hundred Sinn Féiners on the understanding that they were participating in a German Plot.  Privately he gave it as his opinion that if the Irish people realised the true character of de Valera, Marcievicz and Count Plunkett, they ‘would cast them out like the swine they are.’ (Holmes, ibid. p.339, citing French to Lord Esher, 20 May 1918, French Papers)

The Mansion House statement (18 April 1918) that the British Government had ‘made a declaration of war on the Irish nation’ and the British response to send Lord French to set up ‘a quasi-military government’ in Ireland (5 May 1918) may well be claimed as the real start of the war for Irish independence.  Failure to give due prominence to these events distorts our understanding of Ireland at that time.  On the one hand a benign view is portrayed of English rule emanating from Dublin Castle; on the other hand a limited, even disparaging, view is given of the emerging Irish nationalism.  Peter Hart, in a rather bizarre fashion, attempted to make the Wren Boys relevant to the emerging political ideology of a new republican Sinn Féin and even attached some significance to a claim that young people ‘had locked the old people into their homes’ in order that they might not be able to vote in the 1918 election.  To attach any significance to this unverified incident, at a time when Lord French had deported without trial hundreds of leading Sinn Féiners, including c. 35 election candidates, is incredible; it certainly does not make for a sound historical narrative. (Peter Hart, ‘The IRA and its Enemies’ Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1998, pp 178-181 and pp 166,167; Michael Laffan, ‘The Resurrection of Ireland. The Sinn Féin Party 1916-1923’ Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp 143-146)  In similar fashion to Hart, John Horne, in his edited study of Ireland and the First World War, does not cite the Mansion House Declaration or make mention of the military role of Lord French. (John Horne, ed., ‘Our War, Ireland and the Great War’ Royal Irish Academy/Dublin, 2008 nb essay) 

Likewise, the manner in which Peter Hart and David Fitzpatrick have edited the Official British Record of the Rebellion does not make for a balanced historical narrative. (Peter Hart and David Fitzpatrick, eds., British Intelligence in Ireland 1920-1921. The Final Reports, Cork University Press/Cork, 2002).  This document has been central to Peter Hart’s thesis that the IRA were motivated by sectarian considerations.  He cited the document to the effect that ‘in the south the Protestants and those who supported the Government rarely gave much information because, except by chance, they had not got it to give:’ and he then argued that, therefore, the Protestants were attacked for reasons of religion.’ (Hart, IRA, pp 305,306)  However, this argument was only made possible by omitting the next two sentences of the Official Record; and this Peter Hart did.  I pointed out this omission in my review of the book in 1998, writing that the very next sentence of the Record read that ‘an exception to this rule was in the Bandon area where there were many Protestant farmers who gave information.’ (The Month, Sept./Oct. 1998, pp 381-383)  Hart’s argument by omission simply did not stand up in the light of the full report.  There is, incidentally and significantly, no meaningful explanation for the omission of these two sentences in his edited report of 2002.)

Similarly, again using an argument by omission, the joint edition of the Official Record of the Rebellion by Peter Hart and David Fitzpatrick concealed the attitude of British forces towards the Irish.  From the editorial note it was made clear that some parts of the text had been omitted; sections on censorship and topography, for example.  However, without any notification, there was another very significant omission: the section on, ‘The People.’ (Peter Hart and David Fitzpatrick, eds., Irish Narratives, Cork University Press/Cork, 2002, p.16)  ‘Judged by English standards,’ the section stated, ‘the Irish are a difficult and unsatisfactory people.  Their civilisation is different and in many ways lower than that of the English … many were of a degenerate type and their methods of waging war were in most cases barbarous, influenced by hatred and devoid of courage.’ (‘Official Record of the Rebellion in Ireland’ Imperial War Museum, pp 31,32; see Brian P. Murphy, ‘The Wind that Shakes the Barley,’ in Ruan O’Donnell, ed., ‘The Impact of the 1916 Rising’ Irish Academic Press/Dublin, 2008) 

By removing these comments, and others like them, from their edited version of the Record, Hart and Fitzpatrick have protected the image of the British troops who were active in Ireland.  While Fitzpatrick has recently attempted to defend Hart’s scholarship, writing that ‘any slip in Hart’s footnotes is construed by some bloggers and letter-writers as deliberate falsification in pursuit of a preconceived revisionist agenda,’ it seems reasonable to suggest that the approach of Peter Hart (and, indeed, of Fitzpatrick himself) towards the Record of the Rebellion raises issues far more serious than the occasional inaccurate footnote. (David Fitzpatrick, ‘Terror in Ireland 1916-1923’ Lilliput/Dublin, 2012, p.5)  It is in this context that the  early work of Brennan and Gallagher is important: it shows clearly not only that a state of war existed in 1918 but also that the Irish nationalists who participated in it were dedicated and motivated by ideals – not degenerate, not uncivilised and no mere Wren Boys.

Brennan and Gallagher renewed their efforts on behalf of Sinn Féin, despite the pressures of the Lord French regime: firstly, by sustaining the anti-Conscription campaign; and, secondly, by producing literature for the General election in December.  However, before the year ended, Brennan became a victim of martial law: he was arrested c.11 November 1918 and deported immediately to Gloucester.  The Sinn Féin general election manifesto suffered a similar fate to Brennan at the hands of the Press Censor.  However, it was then defiantly published in truncated form, as passed by the Censor, and it made a significant impact.  As Frank Gallagher observed, the neat black rows of dots employed by the censor to blot out the full text ‘became more effective than the most seductive promise.’ (David Hogan (Frank Gallagher), ‘Four Glorious Year’  Dublin, 1953, p.48)  The success of Sinn Féin at the general election; the creation and proclamations of Dáil Éireann (January 1919); and the meeting of the Peace Conference in Paris (January 1919) all combined to create a new situation in Ireland, although the military character of British rule, with its emphasis on martial law, remained the same.  It was in this context that the Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity was formed. 

Origins: The Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity, April 1919

When the Dáil Éireann Department of Publicity began its work on 2 April 1919, with Laurence Ginnell as its first director, the power of the Press Censor and the rule of DORA still dominated Irish life.  Lord Decies and his seventeen staff, based in Grafton Street, still retained their positions, although Decies was replaced by Major Bryan Cooper at the end of April. (Press Censorship Report, CO 904/167, NA Kew for letters of Lord French to Decies re. resignation; Press Censorship Records, 1917-1919, Blue Cards, 47, NAI for details of staff)  Writing of his return to Ireland after the War, Cooper recalled that ‘personally I know that I have never experienced so much kindness and civility from my neighbours as in the eighteen months that followed my return from the army.  To what it may be attributed I do not know, but if the spirit of Sinn Féin was not working in the direction of increased friendliness between Irishmen of different religions and political views, at least it was doing nothing to make ancient differences more bitter.’ (Lennox Robinson, ‘Bryan Cooper’ Constable/London, 1931, p.116 citing Cooper’s unpublished book on Ireland under Sinn Féin)  Coming from an Irishman of ascendancy background who had been elected a Unionist MP in 1910, this assessment of living with Sinn Féin is significant.   

The Dáil Department of Propaganda began work immediately with Frank Gallagher informing his fiancée, Cecilia Saunders of his personal role in the work on 5 April telling her that ‘all this week and some of the last I have been directing propaganda.  I get £4 a week for it … it is a dreadfully busy job.’ (Gallagher to Saunders, 5 April 1919, FG Papers 10050/68, Trinity College MS)  At the same time, Robert Brennan, as director of Sinn Féin publicity, with an office at 6 Harcourt Street, was in regular contact with Gallagher.  These two men were soon joined by Erskine Childers.  He came to Ireland in March 1919 to visit his cousin, the TD Robert Barton, who had been imprisoned under the terms of DORA for an election speech.  Childers then attended two sessions of Dail Éireann on 10 and 11 April; met de Valera and Griffith; and then met Robert Brennan.

It is significant that, as early as April 1919, this connection with Childers had been made and attempts were made to influence English opinion.  Brennan gave Childers information on British military activities in Ireland which he could then place in English newspapers. This information, Brennan noted, had ‘all been carefully listed and indexed by Frank Gallagher.’ (Robert Brennan, Allegiance, Browne and Nolan/Dublin, 1950, p.240)  By this time Childers had committed himself to the Irish Republic as proclaimed by Dáil Éireann.  Writing on 28 January 1919 in The Nation he had declared that to deny an Irish Republic ‘appears to make the Fourteen Points a scrap of paper’ and added that the only way to save the Peace Conference was ‘a spontaneous declaration by Great Britain that she was prepared to recognise the free self-determination of Ireland and to remove her army of occupation and her despotic Castle government.’ (The Nation, 28 Jan. 1919; Brian P. Murphy, ‘Erskine Childers: the evolution of an enemy of Empire,’ in Eoin Flannery and Angus Mitchell, eds., Enemies of Empire. New perspectives on imperialism, literature and historiography, Four Courts Press/Dublin, 2007)  

These observations of Childers accurately convey the broad lines of confrontation between Dáil Eireann and the British Government in the first half of the year, 1919: on the one hand, Dáil Eireann, although not fully functional until all of its members had been released from prison in April 1919, attempted to publicise the ideals of an Irish Republic at the Peace Conference; and, on the other hand, the British Government (and it should be noted it was still a British War Cabinet) prevented the Irish case from being presented at Paris, while it still enforced the DORA in Ireland.  The first phase of the Dáil publicity campaign, in co-operation with Childers, was fought out in the context of the Peace Conference; the second phase was fought out in the context of the British Government’s opposition to the work of Dáil Eireann.  Dáil Eireann had been allowed to meet in public in April and the 9 May but was then forced to meet in private under a constant threat of arrest.  Laurence Ginnell, himself, was arrested under the powers of the Defence of the Realm Act.  On 17 June 1919, Desmond Fitzgerald became Substitute Director of Propaganda owing, as the minutes of Dáil Eireann put it, to Ginnell’s ‘absence through enemy action.’ (Dáil Eireann Minutes, 17 June 1919, p.115 plus grant of £250 per annum to Mrs Ginnell)  It was in this context that the Dáil Eireann Department of Publicity began to present its view of British rule in Ireland to the world.

The Weekly Summary

The Weekly Summary began publishing its survey of events in Ireland on 12 July 1919 under the heading: ‘the following are acts of aggression committed in Ireland by the Military and Police of the usurping English Government.’  The title, itself, accurately summed up Dáil Eireann’s view of the English Government.  Under this heading, daily lists of arrests, suppressed newspapers, banned meetings of Sinn Féin, the Gaelic League and other national associations were given.  Usually the daily list simply recorded the events of the day but occasionally extra detail was added.  For example, on 13 August 1919, it was recorded that the General Hackett Pain who had suppressed a language festival in Ballysheal, county Down, had been Chief of Sir Edward Carson’s ‘revolutionary forces.’ 

There was a significant change to the level of conflict between Dáil Eireann and the Dublin Castle authorities when, on 21 August 1919, Dáil Eireann, as ‘the Government of the Irish Republic,’ announced that it was to launch a National Loan in Ireland and America.  The announcement was carried in most of the national and provincial papers and was also promoted by a special film of the event.  Dublin Castle, in the persons of Lord French, Lord Lieutenant, Ian Macpherson, Chief Secretary and Sir Frederick Shaw, Commander-in-Chief, responded firmly.  On 10 September it declared Dáil EÉireann to be a ‘dangerous association’ and the Loan to be ‘seditious.’  It then proclaimed Sinn Féin and the Gaelic League, in some areas of the country, and many newspapers were suppressed for carrying advertisements of the Loan.  The Weekly Summary chronicled these daily lists of suppressions and, on 13 September, noted that its own offices, at 6 Harcourt Street, had been raided and the police had removed ‘all the propaganda they could find.’ (WS, 13 Sept.1919, p.37 of IB)  The office of Michael Collins and the Dáil Loan was also in 6 Harcourt Street and was also raided.  Michael Collins escaped and the office was moved to 76 Harcourt Street.  From that date the conflict between Dáil Éireann and Dublin Castle took on a new intensity but, despite all the challenges, the Weekly Summary managed to continue publication.

On 30 September 1919 a special edition of the Weekly Summary was published which gave, ‘A Summary of Outrages committed by the British Government in Ireland during the period from 1 May 1916 to 30 September 1919.’ This five page summary (pp 51-55 of the present publication) made interesting reading: not only were the number of murders given but also other items such as deportations, court martials and the suppression of newspapers (23 so far in 1919) were given.

The British response, also made on 30 September 1919, at first glance, was conciliatory: the office of Press Censor was abolished.  Erskine Childers, however, who was in Dublin at the time, gave a different opinion on this action.  He pointed out that ‘soldiers had taken over the duties of the civilian censor whose powers were deemed to be inadequate.’  Childers added that an editor now ‘first becomes aware that he has offended the authorities by the arrival at his door of a lorry bristling with bayonets.  An expert in the sabotage of machinery is included in this cortege and the owner can only save his business by signing an undertaking never to publish anything which is an offence.’  He concluded that ‘servility to the Castle regime or personal ruin are the only alternatives before him.’ (Childers, Law and Order in Ireland, Studies, Dec.1919, pp 602,603)

This analysis by Childers of British policy towards the press received support from a most unlikely source – the former Press Censor, Bryan Cooper, whose post had been terminated in August.  He wrote to The Times on 27 September 1919 and was critical of the suppression of newspapers for carrying advertisements of the National Loan and argued that many of the provincial newspapers were owned by men whose sons had fought in the last war.  He concluded that ‘at a time when it is hoped that the Government have realised the urgency of the Irish question, and propose to bring forward a scheme for its settlement, it would surely be wise to abandon a procedure which only tends to inflame and exasperate moderate opinion in Ireland.’ (Robinson, Cooper, p.124)  Another impartial source, Sir Horace Plunkett’s journal the Irish Statesman, agreed with Cooper.  It praised him as ‘a man of courage, of fair play, and of reasonable mind but concluded that ‘Lord French and his satellites are proof against any argument.  They breathe happily the atmosphere of coercion, and the proclamation of ideas and opinions is dearer to them even than the proclamation of arms.’ (Robinson, Cooper, p.124)  The removal of an official press censor gave increased primacy to the military and it was in this context that the Irish Bulletin began publication.

The Irish Bulletin

On the day that the Irish Bulletin began publication, 11 November 1919, the first anniversary of Armistice Day, there were armed clashes in central Dublin and four lorries containing police and soldiers raided the headquarters of Dáil Éireann at 76 Harcourt Street.  Erskine Childers witnessed the raid and recorded that ‘the morning upon which two minutes silence had been ordained to commemorate ‘the divine blessing of peace,’ the police and military carried out an armed raid upon the Dáil’s offices and arrested every male person upon the premises indiscriminately and without warrant.’  He concluded that ‘we must take a wide view of history to find a parallel for this.  Germany has nothing like it to her credit.’ (Childers, ‘Law and Order in Ireland,’ Dec.1919, Studies, ibid. p.602)  This account by Childers was taken from an article in Studies of December 1919 and it is worthy of note that both Studies and the Catholic Bulletin provide important source material for the period.

In the face of these difficult circumstances, the Irish Bulletin was first published for five days per week and initially the print run was only fifty; very soon, however, it was in the hundreds; and by the Truce of July 1921 about 1,000 copies were distributed worldwide. (Documents of Irish Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 1919-1922, document 102, August 1921; Kathleen McKenna Napoli, ‘Irish Bulletin,’ Capuchin Annual, 1970; Keiko Inoue, ‘Propaganda II: Propaganda of Dáil Éireann, 1919-1921’ in Joost Augusteijn, ed., ‘The Irish Revolution’ Palgrave/Basingstoke, 2002)  Kathleen McKenna claimed to have typed and mimeographed all of the copies that were produced.  There were some five other members of the staff and there was co-operation with the offices of Diarmuid O’Hegarty, secretary to Dáil Éireann, and his staff who were based in O’Connell Street.  The filing and indexing of information was very professional: McKenna, for example, claimed that she was responsible for ‘the Macpherson file.’  That such a file existed confirms the earlier statements of Brennan and Gallagher and speaks volumes about the level of research and the detailed planning which characterised the work that went into the Irish Bulletin.  The work was carried out under the constant threat of arrest and, for that reason, the location was frequently moved: from Harcourt Street to 22 Upper Mount Street and then to 11 Molesworth Street where, for some time, it occupied offices in the same building as the Crown Solicitor. (Hogan, ‘Four Glorious Yeas,’ pp 118,119; Robert Brennan, ‘Allegiance’ Browne and Nolan/Dublin, 1950, pp 264,265)  The cost of running the Department for the first six months up to 31 May 1920 was c.£900 (£889..17..10 to be precise): £392 for salaries; £235 for printing and stationery; and £261 was dispensed by the Head of the Department. (Documents of Irish Foreign Policy, Document 36, June 1920)  These expenses were considerable and they provide a clear example of Dáil Éireann attempting to act as an effective government.

Both FitzGerald and Childers established valuable contacts in London with representatives of the world’s press and were assisted by Art O’Brien, the Dáil representative in London, although he did have some differences with FitzGerald. (Mitchell, ‘Revolutionary Government’ pp 104,105)  Their efforts were helped, in particular, by the Dáil Department of Foreign Affairs which, like the Department of Publicity, acted as if it was an institution of a working government.   The published documents of the Department provide invaluable source material for the period.  There was a frank admission that the representatives of the foreign press living in London were dependent on English sources, emanating from Dublin Castle, for their news of Ireland.  It was in order to combat this source of news that FitzGerald spent much time in London and got in touch with many representatives of the foreign press and persuaded them to accept the Irish Bulletin.  He found these men, in his own words, to be ‘friendly and interested.’ In order to get immediate news to these sources he turned to Martin Fitzgerald of the Freeman’s Journal who allowed him a daily transmission of 300 words on that paper’s private wire – a source of publicity that has largely gone unrecognised. (DFA, Docsm 36 and 41) 

The efforts of Fitzgerald and Childers were eminently successful.  On 26 April 1920 the Irish Bulletin spelt out just how many press correspondents had visited Ireland in response to a claim in the Morning Post (23 April 1920) that ‘the British public know little enough of what is really happening in Ireland, because no newspaper correspondent, unless he is a Sinn Féiner, is safe in that country.’  Under a humorous heading, ‘Press Correspondents who Escaped Death in Ireland’ the Bulletin listed fifteen London newspapers who had sent representatives to Ireland including a special correspondent of the Morning Post.  It then named twelve correspondents of the foreign press who had recently visited Ireland and noted that, far from being murdered, they had publicly acknowledged the courtesy shown to them by Sinn Féin Headquarters. (IB, 26 April 1920, pp 454,455 of book)

Another important strategy to spread the information contained in the Irish Bulletin was to provide copy to friendly Members of Parliament who, in turn, raised questions in the House of Commons.  The information was then given prominence again by the Bulletin.  For example, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, a friend of Childers, who had visited Ireland in November 1919, raised questions on arrests in Parliament on 9 December.  His questions and critical comments about the condition of Ireland were then given a second airing, on 22 December, under the provocative heading, ‘Coercion Provokes Outrages.’  By the time of the Truce (11 July 1921), several MPs were co-operating with the Dáil Propaganda Department in this manner of presenting facts about Ireland. 

This process of using a striking headline as a preface to a succinct account of an important issue became an integral part of the Irish Bulletin’s policy.  For example, on 26 November 1919, under the heading ‘Irish Soldiers and English Rule’ the Irish Bulletin reported that Ian Macpherson, the Chief Secretary, had stated that ‘Irish soldiers have had a very difficult time since returning to civil life.’  The Bulletin responded by stating that ‘this statement applied to the vast majority of Irish soldiers is untrue’ and maintained that most of these ex-soldiers who had fought for ‘the freedom of small nations returned to find their own country under the heel of a militarism undreamt by the Prussian.’  To prove its point, the Bulletin recorded that it was for that reason that the Irish Nationalist Veterans’ Association, the largest body of organised ex-soldier in Ireland, refused to participate in the Peace Day celebrations on 19 July ‘because their country was in the grip of an alien Army of Occupation.’ (IB, 26 Nov.1919, pp 101,102, citing Irish Daily Press 17 July 1919)  Other examples were given and the theme was returned to regularly.  For example, on 28 November 1919, one of the caption headings was ‘Ex-Soldiers against Macpherson Regime’ and details were given of the Irish Nationalist Veterans’ Association resolution against the Government’s repressive measures. (IB, 28 Nov.1919, p.104)

This exposure of the military character of British rule and the lack of freedom of the press was a regular feature of the Irish Bulletin.  For example, on 8 December 1919, under the heading ‘Archbishop of Dublin on English Rule,’ it made its point in a telling fashion.  Archbishop Walsh had made a donation of £105 to the Dáil Loan but, when no newspaper in Ireland would publish his donation, he wrote (on 10 November) to Cardinal O’Connell of New York and requested that the donation be passed on by him and made public.  ‘The freedom of the Press’ Archbishop Walsh wrote, ‘the right of public meeting, the right of personal liberty, even the right of trial by jury, no longer exist in this country, except in so far as they can exist subject to the absolutely uncontrolled discretion of some military ruler technically designated the “competent military authority.”‘   This authority, Walsh maintained, was the source of all Irish evils. (IB, 8 Dec.1919, pp 121,122)  As if to prove Archbishop Walsh right, the Freeman’s Journal was suppressed, on 15 December, under a directive from the Competent Military Authority and the DMP forcibly closed down the paper. 

This pattern of a striking headline to illustrate a significant event continued to be a regular feature of the Irish Bulletin.  A new dimension, however, was added with the addition of in-depth articles on particular topics.  One of the first of these was the coverage given to the Municipal Council elections that were held on 16 January 1920.  Using references from the Manchester Guardian (12 January), the Bulletin made the point that Dublin Castle had made it as difficult as possible for Sinn Féin to win the election.  ‘Dublin Castle suddenly discovered Proportional Representation’’ the Manchester Guardian declared, ‘as a means whereby a Sinn Féin majority would be prevented from becoming a Sinn Féin majority.’ (IB, 19 Jan.1920) 

The words of Arthur Griffith, taken from an interview with the Irish Independent, were then used by the Bulletin to add substance to this charge.  ‘Sinn Féin,’ Griffith stated, ‘had to face this election with its political organisation suppressed by the English Government, its election literature interdicted, its transit arrangements deliberately obstructed by the Motor Permit Order, its secretary, Alderman Kelly, seized and imprisoned without charge, and its Press stifled, and, in spite of all, it had swept the country. (IB, 20 Jan 1920 citing Irish Indep. 19 Jan.)  Sinn Féin had, indeed, swept the country and the Bulletin gave special significance to the victory in Derry – 21 Sinn Féiners (Nationalists) to 19 Unionists – and, on 21 January, published Griffith’s message to de Valera that ‘Derry joins hands with Limerick in the unity of Ireland.’ 

There was an acute awareness that these election results presented a challenge to the special provisions for Ulster in the new Home Rule plans of Walter Long and Carson.  The Irish Bulletin, using comments in the Evening Telegraph, made this clear on 23 January declaring that ‘the capture of Derry means much more than a victory in the domain of local politics.  It is a symbol, the meaning of which can neither be ignored nor evaded by the inventors of a homogenous Ulster, the most notorious political fiction of our day.’ In conclusion the Bulletin pointed out the same result had manifested itself all over what it termed ‘the new state of Carsonia’ with Lurgan, Dungannon, Carrickfergus, Larne, Limavaddy, Cookstown and Lisburn all rejecting Carson nominees. (IB, 23 Jan.1919 from Evening Telegraph, 21 Jan.1919) 

This awareness accurately reflected the policy on Ulster and Home Rule that was being developed by influential Unionists at that very time.  Walter Long reported on his visit to Ireland in January 1920 that ‘people in the inner circles hold the view that the new province should consist of the six counties, the idea being that the inclusion of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan would provide such an access of strength to the Roman Catholic Party, that the supremacy of the Unionists would be seriously threatened.’  It was this ideology, fundamentally sectarian, that led to a six county Ulster in the Government of Ireland Act of December 1920 (John Kendle, ‘Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920’ Glendale/Dublin, 1992, p.186 citing W. Long ‘Report on Visit to Ireland’ January 1920)

Other in depth articles, also vital to assessing the character of English rule in Ireland, were produced on the power politics at work in Dublin Castle.  The articles were prompted by a series of actions taken against supporters of Dáil Éireann.  For example, the Irish Bulletin (26 January 1920) carried a headline: ‘English Labour Delegates Astonished. Irish Industries Commission Suppressed by Force.’  It then reported that a British Labour Party delegation had witnessed armed forces eject members of a Commission of Enquiry into Ireland’s industrial resources from the Cork City Hall and had commented that it could not see any reason for such an action ‘unless it be part of a deliberate policy, calculated to hinder the development of Irish industries.’ (IB, 26 Jan. 1920 pp 218,219) 

In another example, the Irish Bulletin (2 Feb.1920) reported, under the headline ‘Wholesale Raids and Arrests by English Forces’ that over fifty homes had been raided in Dublin and that Robert Barton MP for West Wicklow had been arrested.  Barton’s subsequent trial by court martial and deportation was reported later. (IB, 2 Feb. 1920, p.234 and 24 Feb.1920, p.299)  Although it was not specified by the Bulletin, it was significant that Barton, as head of the Dáil Department of Agriculture, had created a National Land Bank with Erskine Childers and Lionel Smith Gordon as leading advisers.  All three men were Protestants.  The arrest of Barton, therefore, was a blow not only to the development of Ireland’s agricultural resources but also to the plans of Dáil Éireann for Protestants to play a leading role in the sensitive issue of land reform.  One hardly needs to note that this ecumenical approach by Dáil Éireann, and the ruthless suppression of it by Dublin Castle, completely undermines the claim of Peter Hart that the republican movement was sectarian.  His claim of ‘ethnic cleansing’ refers to the years 1922/1923 and needs to be assessed in that context. (Peter Hart, ‘The IRA at War 1916-1923’ Oxford University Press/Oxford, p.237)

Faced by these events, and others like them, such as the deportation of c.50 Dublin citizens to Wormwood Scrubbs without trial in early February, the Irish Bulletin attempted to identify more precisely those responsible. (IB, 9 Feb.1920, p.249 for ‘Representative Irishmen Deported.’)  It headlined the issue of 24 February 1919: ‘Facts Concerning the Real Ruler of Ireland.’  The starting point for this exposure of the regime in Dublin Castle was the statement in the Sunday Chronicle that ‘the real ruler of Ireland is Sir John Taylor.’ (IB, 24 Feb.1920, p.295; see IB 12 Dec.1919, p.131 for an earlier veiled reference to Taylor by Arthur Griffith)  This title was justified by the Irish Bulletin, in a remarkably detailed account, which maintained that Taylor, the Assistant Under-Secretary, was ‘the inspiring figure of the coercion regime.’ 

The case against Taylor was made by providing details of his career; his association with Arthur Balfour, when he was Chief Secretary for Ireland in the 1880’s; his association with Walter Long as Chief Secretary in 1905-1906; his re-emergence, once again in association with Long, to a more influential position in 1918; and his dominant role at the Castle in late 1919/early 1920 with the absence of Ian Macpherson, Chief Secretary, from Ireland.  That Taylor, who it was claimed had contributed to the Piggott forgeries against Parnell and to the preparatory work on the Perpetual Coercion Act of 1887, was the dominant power in Dublin Castle spoke volumes about the British administration in Ireland.  The exposure was made more complete, when the Irish Bulletin revealed Taylor’s links with Alan Bell.   

On 9 March 1920, the Irish Bulletin reported that Taylor had recalled his former colleague to Dublin Castle ‘to assist in the connection of conspiracy charges against the Republican leaders.’ (IB, 9 March 1920, pp 339,340)  Bell’s role with the English Secret Service in the 1880’s and his part in the Piggott forgeries was then outlined.  Copies of Bell’s recent directives to Bank managers to attend the Police Courts, Inns’ Quay, Dublin, on 8 March, to reveal their transactions with Dáil Éireann or any banned organisation were then given.  Bell was to preside over this court and his private papers reveal that he knew what he was looking for: cheques from Michael Collins (Dáil Loan), Robert Barton and Lionel Smith Gordon (National Land Bank), Bishop Fogarty and James O’Mara (Dáil Trustees) and Darrell Figgis (Secretary of Commission into Ireland’s Resources and Industries) were in his file.  Files on the deaths of policemen were also kept. (See Bell File, ‘List of Questions to Bank Managers’ and ‘Crime Enquiries’ re. his investigation into the killing of policemen, CO 904/177/1, NA Kew)  In other words, Bell was engaged in a significant attack not only on the constructive work of Dáil Éireann but also on the activities of the Squad that Michael Collins had created.

The Irish Bulletin concluded that Bell had been appointed a Resident Magistrate to conceal his real work.  The powers enjoyed by Bell, it maintained ‘are greater than those conferred upon any of the Judges of the High Court of Justice in Great Britain and Ireland;’ and cited the Freeman’s Journal that ‘no judge of the High Court in Ireland could order the witness to answer.  But Mr Alan Bell, who holds office at the bidding of the Executive … may decide the great issues that are reserved from the judges of the High Court.  And Mr Bell is a gentleman without legal training.’ (IB, 11 March, 1920, pp 346,347; Weekly ‘Act of Aggression’ IB, 8 March 1920, pp 35,351)  The detailed accounts of Taylor and Bell tell us much about the Irish Bulletin and the character of the war: for the Irish Bulletin state terror, as exemplified by Taylor and Bell’s use of DORA, was as much an enemy of Dáil Éireann as the British Crown Forces. 

One does not use the term ‘state terror’ lightly: it was used by William Wylie, the legal adviser to Dublin Castle at the time, who referred to Taylor and his supporters as ‘the Taylor gang who believed in reprisals and terrorism and whose slogan was “No Home Rule” (Leon O Broin, ‘W.E. Wylie and the Irish Revolution 1916-1921’ Gill and Macmillan/Dublin, 1989, p.53)  ‘Terror’ was also used by the Freeman’s Journal, when selecting a title for a book of its cartoons for the years 1920-1921.  The book was called ‘The Reign of Terror’ and the cartoons were the work of an English artist, Ernest Forbes Holgate (1879-1962), known as ‘Shemus.’ (Felix M. Larkin, ‘Terror and Discord. The Shemus Cartoons in the Freeman’s Journal, 1920-1924’ Farmar/Dublin, 2009)  There would appear to be lessons here for the writing of the history of the period but, despite some fine articles, little attention is paid to this aspect of the conflict in the recent book on ‘Terror in Ireland’ edited by David Fitzpatrick. (David Fitzpatrick, ed., ‘Terror in Ireland 1916-1923,’ Lilliput/Dublin, 2012; see comprehensive reviews of this book by John M Regan and Niall Meehan in the Dublin Review of Books)


The Irish Bulletin, having exposed the powers of Alan Bell, remained silent about his death.  He was killed in Dublin, on 26 March 1920, by members of the Squad of Michael Collins.  It was the policy of the Bulletin not to publish details of IRA killings.  While this does diminish the comprehensive coverage given to the war, it does not take away from the accuracy of its account of British rule in Ireland, both civilian and military.  Instead of dealing with Bell, the Bulletin gave extensive coverage to the killing of Thomas MacCurtain, Lord Mayor of Cork, on 20 March 1920.  The deaths of MacCurtain and Bell led to major changes both in Dublin Castle and at the Irish Bulletin.  The administration at Dublin Castle was changed by the enforced resignation of Sir John Taylor, Assistant Under-Secretary, on 19 April 1920 and the earlier appointment of Hamar Greenwood as Chief Secretary on 2 April 1920.  The work of the Irish Bulletin was also changed by the arrest of Frank Gallagher on 27 March and his imprisonment in Mountjoy where he joined the other prisoners on hunger strike.  He was not released until 14 April and he was too weak to resume work until the end of the month. (Hogan, ‘Four Glorious Years’ pp 149,150. He was arrested under the name of David Hogan; Frank Gallagher, ‘Days of Fear’ Murray/London, 1928 for an account of his hunger-strike) Robert Brennan assumed the major responsibility for the Irish Bulletin during this period and he was greatly helped by Erskine Childers.  These two men, therefore, were mainly responsible for the last month’s publication of the Bulletin which appears in this book.

Brennan and Childers began a new imitative on 23 March.  On that date Childers sent an article to the Daily News entitled ‘Military Rule in Ireland.’  It was published on 29 March and was followed by seven other articles in April and May.  Extracts from these articles were then used by the Irish Bulletin to telling effect.  For example, on 7 April, under the heading, ‘Military Rule in Ireland, what it Means to Women’ the Irish Bulletin recounted the case histories of several women including Mrs Maurice Collins, five weeks short of confinement whose husband was arrested under 14B of DORA and who was raided several times in the early hours of the morning.  Childers also wrote about an incident at Brennan’s own house where his young wife and three young children were raided by soldiers with bayonets in the middle of the night, and he concluded that ‘this is not a civilised war.’  Brennan chose not to include this account of his own family in the Irish Bulletin. (IB, 7 April 1920, pp 402,403; Erskine Childers, ‘Military Rule in Ireland’ Dublin 1920, pp 8-12) 

Another extract from the Dáil News was published in the Irish Bulletin on 21 April 1920 under the heading, ‘The Army of Spies and their Work.’  The words of Childers (one of the last items in this book) sum up the aims and aspirations of all those who worked in the Dáil Department of Publicity: ‘I want to insist on this general statement,’ Childers said, ‘that an attempt is being made to break up a whole national organisation, a living, vital, magnificent thing, normally and democratically evolved from the intense desire of a fettered and repressed people for self-reliance and self-development.  This attempt, if we are to give words their right meaning, is the great, the fundamental crime.’ (IB, 21 April 1920, p.442; Erskine Childers, Daily News, 19 April 1920)  In a remarkable way this analysis by Childers mirrors the conclusion by Lord Decies, made in March 1918 and cited earlier, that for Sinn Féin ‘the leading text is that England holds Ireland by force, divorced from moral right.’  This clear expression of the continuity of the lines of conflict confirms the suggestion that the year 1918 might be considered as the start of the Anglo-Irish war.  Significantly, too, in the light of the recent book on ‘Terror in Ireland’ when the articles by Childers in the Daily News were published in French, they appeared under the title ‘La Terreur Militaire en Irelande – The Military Terror in Ireland.’ 

The very title summed up the case that the Irish Bulletin and Erskine Childers were trying to make: that is, the terror associated with military rule was preventing the democratic institutions of the Irish Republic from working.  Moreover, it was clearly spelt out that the policy of that emerging democracy was not sectarian.  By not recognising the source value of the Irish Bulletin and the manuscript material of those who worked on it, Peter Hart, and others, have constructed an alternative historical narrative; and, herein, lies the supreme irony.  Many of the papers of Erskine Childers are to be found in the Manuscript Room at Trinity College and could profitably have been used to good historical effect. 

However, on the one occasion that Peter Hart did refer to the Childers papers, he was selective in his use of them.  Although he did quote from the unpublished essay by Childers on ‘The Irish Revolution,’ in which he described the Irish Volunteers as ‘the soul of a new Ireland’ he saw fit not to include another passage from the essay in which Childers stated that ‘it is worth noting once more that the violence evoked in this year (1919) was slight.  Nor was it indiscriminate or undisciplined.  At no time, neither then nor subsequently, have civilians – Protestant Unionists living scattered and isolated in the South and West, been victimised by the republicans on account of their religion or religious opinion.’ (Hart, ‘RA and Enemies,’ p.165; Erskine Childers, ‘The Irish Revolution’ 8, Childers Papers, 7808/29, Trinity MS)  I adverted to the way in which Hart had used the essay by Childers in my review of his book in 1998 but, as with the questions relating to his selective use of the Official Record of the Rebellion, no answers were ever given. (The Month, Sept./Oct. 1998, pp 381-383) 

The use of source material is central to the historical debate and the issue is compounded by the fact that, from the very first, Peter Hart’s publications were aired not only in the pages of academic studies but also in the pages of the press.  Indeed, they were promoted by Kevin Myers in the Irish Times and by Eoghan Harris in the Sunday Independent.  The interventions by Harris are motivated, on his own admission, by a political purpose.  Writing in the Sunday Independent on 17 December 2006, Harris admitted that he was a member of the Reform Group which ‘for the past ten years have been trying to put Southern attacks against Protestants in 1921-1922 on the public agenda.’ (Sunday Independent, 17 Dec.2006)  Harris has certainly pursued his campaign with the vigour of a polemicist who is not prepared to let facts get in the way of his political agenda.  Both in his weekly column in the Sunday Independent and in some feature programmes on RTE, he has given prominence to events which are, in his words, ‘at the very Hart of our Sectarian History.’ (Ibid; see Brian P Murphy, ‘Poisoning the Well or Publishing the Truth?’ in Niall Meehan, ed., Troubles in Irish History, 2008)  For better or worse the academic reputation of Peter Hart has become associated with the populist polemics of Eoghan Harris.

In the midst of this historical debate, it will surely be accepted that the objective use of original source material is a prerequisite to the construction of any sound historical narrative; and, in that context, the advice of Alice Stopford Green is still relevant: ‘we do not want in Ireland, the absence of history, we do want a larger study of its truth.’ (Alice Stopford Green, The Westminster Gazette’ 11 March 1904)  The specific opinion of Alice Stopford Green on the IRA would also appear to be relevant.  She was a Protestant, a distinguished historian, and her niece, Dorothy Stopford, was a doctor practising in Kilbrittain, west Cork, at the centre of IRA activities.  This is what Alice Stopford Green wrote of the IRA in the late 1920’s: ‘It would be hard to find in the country a body of men equal to the Irish Volunteers.  Sober, self-respecting, upright, they give the unique spectacle of an army of revolutionaries protecting life and property, maintaining the only law and order that now exists in Ireland, suppressing burglary and crime, doing equal justice in their courts to Protestant and Catholic, landowner, policeman, Republican and Unionist.’ (Alice Stopford Green, The Irish Republican Army’ Benjamin Franklin Bureau/Chicago; see also Leon O Broin, ‘Protestant Nationalists in Revolutionary Ireland. The Stopford Connection’ Gill and Macmillan/Dublin, 1985)